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I. INTRODUCTION

A day in Darfur may mean waking up to aerial bombardment of one's
village, followed by ground forces, known as the Janjaweed, stealing one's
livestock, burning one's home, shooting one's father, and raping one's
sister. One may flee the racial insults and gunfire only to find oneself as
a refugee or trapped in an internally displaced persons camp without any
recourse against one's victimizers.' The atrocities in the Darfur region of
Sudan have resulted in more lives lost than the situations in "Bosnia,
Kosovo, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Somalia, and Algeria combined."2 On
March 31, 2005, the U.N. Security Council referred the situation in Darfur
to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Security
Council Resolution 1593.' Consequently, the ICC must decide the issue of
whether genocide is occurring in Sudan. The United States and the United

1. See infra Part IH.B.
2. Lina Sapienza, UN. Report: Classifyingthe Killings in Sudan as Genocide, 19 N.Y.L.
ScH. J. HuM. RTS. 889, 889-90 (2003).
3. S.C. Res. 1593, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
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Nations, however, disagree on whether genocide is occurring in Sudan.4
The major contention, and therefore critical element for ICC prosecutions,
is whether there is sufficient evidence of genocidal intent.
In light of the ICC Prosecutor's investigation, it is necessary to
determine whether the atrocities in Darfur constitute genocide. Therefore,
the purpose of this Article is to review the evolution of the genocide
question and to conduct a legal analysis of whether genocide has been
committed or is being committed in Darfur. The scope of this Article is
limited to the crime of genocide and does not include crimes against
humanity or war crimes.5
Part II explains the ICC and its procedural requirements, especially in
relation to the recent Security Council Resolution, and further details the
development of the international law of genocide. Part III provides
demographic and historical background information on Sudan and
describes the current conflict in Darfur. Part IV reviews the conflicting
positions of the United States and the United Nations on whether genocide
is occurring in Darfur. It further provides the legal analysis to debunk the
U.N. position against a finding of genocide and to support the position that
there is sufficient evidence of genocidal intent in Darfur. Part V concludes
the Article.
II. THE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE CONTEXT OF THE
ICC INVESTIGATION

A. ProceduralAspects of the Rome Statute: The Frameworkof the ICC
and Its Application to the Atrocities in Darfur
The Rome Statute establishes and governs the ICC.6 The ICC is a
permanent international tribunal with criminal jurisdiction over serious
international crimes.'

4. See infra Part IV.B.
5. Genocide is the focus of this Article because: (1) it is one of the most egregious crimes
in violation ofjus cogens norms, (2) it has been the subject of inquiry by both the United Nations
and the United States, (3) it has been the subject of recent media attention, (4) the ultimate finding
has been in dispute and will now be decided by the ICC, and (5) if there is a finding of genocide,
international law imposes obligations on states to prevent and punish it.
6. Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court art. 1, Sept. 1998,2187 U.N.T.S. 91-92
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
7. Id.
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The ICC has authority, analogous to what American lawyers would call
subject matter jurisdiction, over the crimes enumerated in Article five of
the Rome Statute If certain preconditions are met,9 the ICC has
competence, analogous to what American lawyers would call personal
jurisdiction, over issues referred to it by a state party to the Rome Statute'0
and over issues initiated by the Prosecutor of the ICC." More importantly,
the ICC has this personal jurisdiction over issues referred to it by the U.N.
Security Council. 2 The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over any person, not
just military personnel. 3
Once a situation is within the authority and competence of the ICC, the
Prosecutor under Article 54 has certain obligations and authority relating
to an investigation. The Prosecutor shall investigate "all facts and evidence
relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility"
under the Rome Statute,' 4 and "ensure the effective investigation and
prosecution" of those crimes." The Prosecutor has interaliathe power and
discretion to "collect and examine evidence,"'" question perpetrators,
witnesses, and victims,' 7 and gain state cooperation."8
The ICC has subject matter jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. 9
The ICC satisfied the personal jurisdiction requirement on March 31,2005
when the U.N. Security Council officially "refer[red] the situation in
Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court" in Security Council Resolution 1593.20 The resolution reiterated
that the Darfur situation was a "threat to international peace and security"'
and commanded all parties to assist the ICC and its Prosecutor.22

8. Id. art. 5.
9. The ICC may only exercise jurisdiction in these two cases if the conduct occurred in the
territory of a party state (Rome Statute art. 12(2)(a)), or if the conduct was committed by a national
of a state party (Rome Statute art. 12(2Xb)), or ifa non-party has accepted ICC jurisdiction (Rome
Statute art. 12(3)).
10. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 13(a).

11. Id. art. 13(c).
12. Id. art. 13(b). Security Council referrals do not have to meet the special preconditions in
Article twelve of the Rome Statute.
13. See id.art. 25(l).

14. Id. art. 54(1)(a).
15.
16.
17.
18.

Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 54(l)(b).
Id. art. 54(3Xa).
Id. art. 54(3)(b).
Id. art. 54(3)(c).

19. Id. art. 5(1)(a).
20. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3,
21. Id.
22. Id. 2.
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Although the United States still opposes the ICC, the United States did
not exercise its veto, but instead abstained because it wanted to end
impunity in Darfur.23 The resolution determines that the domestic courts
of states, which are not parties to the Rome Statute, will have exclusive
jurisdiction over individuals from those states.' This concession is
important because it means that U.S. nationals will not be subject to ICC
jurisdiction, but are still subject to U.S. jurisdiction.25
B. Definition of Genocide
1. The International Law of Genocide Defined
Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew who fled from the Nazis during World
War I, coined the term "Genocide" in 1944.26 It is derived from the Greek
word genos meaning "race or tribe" and the Latin word cide meaning
' The international community embodied the legal definition of
"killing."27
genocide originally in The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (hereafter "Genocide Convention") in 1948.28
This same definition of genocide is articulated in Article 6 of the Rome
Statute:
[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;

23. Warren Hoge, UN. Votes to SendAny Sudan War CrimeSuspects to World Court,N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at A6; Press Release SC/835 1, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur,
Sudan, to Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, U.N. SCOR, 5158th mtg. (Mar. 31,2005)
[hereinafter Press Release SC/835 1].
24. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3, 6.
25. See Hoge, supranote 23, at A6; Press Release SC/835 1,supranote 23. The United States
had initially supported "a hybrid tribunal in Africa." Id.
26. David Bosco, Crime of Crimes: Does It Have to Be Genocidefor the World to Act?,
WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at B01; Sonali B. Shah, Comment: The Oversight of the Last Great
InternationalInstitution ofthe Twentieth Century: The InternationalCriminalCourt's Definition
of Genocide, 16 EMORYINT'LL. REV. 351,353 (2002); David L. Nersessian,Article: The Contours
of GenocidalIntent: TroublingJurisprudencefromthe InternationalCriminalTribunals,37 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 231, 246 (2002).
27. David L. Nersessian, The Razor's Edge: DefiningandProtectingHuman Groups Under
the GenocideConvention, 36 CORNELLINT'LL.J. 294,296 (2003); Shah, supra note 26, at 353-54;
Nersessian, supra note 26, at 246.
28. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S 280 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; Nersessian, supra note 27, at 293.
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(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) 29Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
The definition of genocide can also be found in the statutes forming the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)." Thus, the two
tribunals' opinions are helpful in expressing what has developed as the
international law of genocide. 3
Genocide can be broken down into two components: the mens rea and
the actus reus.32 The actus reus would consist of performing one or more
of the prohibited acts enumerated in the Genocide Convention.33 The mens
rea requirement is the specific intent (or dolus specialis) to "destroy, in
whole or in part. . . , a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such." 4
2. International Obligations and Consequences of Genocide
The law of genocide is recognized as customary international law and
ajus cogens norm."s Customary international law is law that applies to and
binds all states. Thus, even if a State is not a party to the Genocide
Convention36 or the Rome Statute, it is still obligated under international
law to obey their terms as to genocide. More importantly, ajus cogens

29. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 6.
30. David Alonzo-Maizlish, Note, In Whole Orin Part: GroupRights, the IntentElement of
Genocide, andthe "Quantitative Criterion", 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1369, 1371-72 (2002).
31. See Nersessian, supranote 26, at 240.
32. Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment 90 (May
21, 1999) [hereinafter Kayishema and Ruzindana]. The case law from the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda is available at its web site, http://www.ictr.org.
33. See id. 100.
34. Id. 91.
35. Id. 88; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, Judgment, 154 (June 7,
2001) (customary international law).
36. Sudan is not a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ESCOR,
Comm'n on Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the DarfurRegion of the Sudan, 61 st
Sess., 44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/3 (May 7, 2004) [hereinafter ESCOR Report].
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norm is a rule that is recognized as so fundamental to civilized people that
it cannot even be contracted around." Jus cogens norms are superior to
treaty law and apply to all countries.3" Therefore, the prohibition against
genocide is not subject to qualification in any way. The Genocide
Convention makes genocide a punishable international crime, 9 requires
state parties to enact domestic legislation to punish genocide,' and
requires prosecution in domestic courts or an international court.4 Article
one of the Genocide Convention obligates parties to "prevent" and
"punish" genocide,4' but Article 8 gives them the option of"call[ing] upon
the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the
Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide...."
3. Additional International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law
The law of genocide is not the only international restriction on what
states may do to human beings. There is also international humanitarian
law, which governs the treatment of persons during armed conflict, and
human rights law, which governs the treatment of persons even in the
absence of armed conflict.
In addition to being held accountable for customary international law
norms, Sudan is a state party to "the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), and the African Charter on Human and
People's Rights." Sudan is also a signatory to the Rome Statute.4'
Under the ICCPR certain human rights cannot be abridged, including
"the right to life; the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment; the prohibition of slavery, the slave trade and servitude; and
the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. " The ICCPR also

37. See generally Shah, supra note 26, at 379.

38. Id.
39. Genocide Convention, supra note 28, arts. 1, 3.
40. Id. art. 5.
41. Id. art. 6.

42. Id. art. 1.
43. Id. art. 8. To this author, these two provisions create an open question as to whether a
State party may or must act alone to prevent and punish genocide in the absence of U.N. approval
or whether a State party must rely on the U.N. system alone to prevent and punish genocide.
44. ESCOR Report 38.
45. Id.
46. Id. 41.
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requires that detainees must be treated with humanity and respect for their
personal dignity, and it prohibits "hostages, abductions or unacknowledged
detention.., genocide and discrimination; deportation or forcible transfer
of populations... and forced displacement by expulsion or other coercive
means. ..."4Under the ICERD, Sudan is required to ensure the removal
of limitations based on race or ethnicity.4 s Under the Rome Statute,
individuals may be found liable for "genocide, war crimes or crimes
9
against humanity" defined in Articles 6 through 8.
In addition to the international restrictions on the State of Sudan, the
rebels, the Janjaweed, and the government of Sudan are all bound by
common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, as international
humanitarian law that applies even in internal armed conflicts and applies
as customary international law. ° Common Article 3 proscribes "violence
.. .murder . . . mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; committing
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment; and hostage-taking." 5'

Hl1. THE SITUATION IN SUDAN
A. BackgroundInformation
1. Current Demographic Information on Sudan
Sudan is about the size of one-quarter of the United States, which
makes it geographically the biggest country in Africa. 2 It consists of 26
states governed by an authoritarian military regime.5 3 The capital of Sudan
is in Khartoum.' In 2004, Sudan was 52% Black and 39% Arab.5" Sudan
exports "oil and petroleum products[,] cotton, sesame, livestock,
groundnuts, gum Arabic, [and] sugar."' Eighty percent of Sudan's labor

47. Id.
48. Id. 44.
49. ESCOR Report 145.
50. Id. 42.
51. Id.
52. Central Intelligence Agency, The WorldFactbook:Sudan, availableat http://www.cia.
gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/su.html (last modified Dec. 16, 2004) (copy on file with author).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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force works in agriculture, which is vulnerable to civil unrest, drought,
hostile weather, and global pricing."
2. History of Sudan
Sudan has a long history of political upheaval and warfare. Both the
Egyptians and the British Empire have claimed to conquer Sudan. Sudan
became independent in 1956, but this did not do away with political
upheavals.58
Sudan was in a state of civil war from 1955 to 1972.' 9 The
parliamentary form of government was brought down by a coup led by
Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud in 1958. ' After a period of having
a provisional government, a coalition government governed by Prime
Minister Muhammad Ahmad Mahjoub formed in 1965.61 However, from
1966 to 1969 Sudan experienced a succession of different governments,
which were led mainly by Arab Muslims.62 In 1969 a military coup led by
Col. Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiri banned parliament and prohibited all
political parties. 3 In July 1971 the Sudanese Communist Party led a brief
but ultimately unsuccessful coup returning power to Nimeiri.' Sudan
experienced 10 years of peace after the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972,
with the exception of a failed coup attempt made by the Ansars in 1976.65
In 1983, Nimeiri introduced "Shari'a (Islamic law)" into the criminal
code and announced a "state of emergency" which resulted in suspension
of rights, new criminal courts to enforce Islamic law, and the return of
civil war. In 1985, Sudan encountered fuel and bread deficiencies,
drought, famine, and unrest in the South.67 That year, Gen. Suwar alDahab led a coup which ended Nimeiri's rule. Even after elections civil
war continued. 8 In 1989, military officers took over the government and

57. Central Intelligence Agency, supranote 52.

58. Id.
59. U.S. Department ofState Bureau ofAfrican Affairs,BackgroundNote:Sudan (Jan. 2005)
[hereinafter Sudan], availableat http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm (Jan. 2005) (copy on

file with author).
60. Id.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Sudan, supranote 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.
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Col. Omar Hassan al-Bashir became President of Sudan.69 In 1991, Sudan
instituted a criminal code based on Islamic law, which allowed for future
application in the south. 0 In 1993, Muslim judges replaced non-Muslim
judges in the south and new police were introduced to enforce the new
laws.7
In the 1990s rebel factions began to develop.72 In 2003, the Sudan
Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) led an uprising in Darfur.7 3 The Government of Sudan
acting with the militias, known as the Jingaweit or Janjaweed, responded
to the uprising by attacking villages and civilians in Darfur.74 On January
9, 2005 the Sudanese government and the rebels signed the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement."
B. The Current Conflict in Darfur
1. Overview of Current Conflict
With the historical backdrop of constant warfare and governmental
upheaval, it is not surprising that internal conflict would foster the current
level of atrocities suffered in Darfur.76 In February 2003, rebel groups
known as the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) 77 and the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) attacked the government, alleging governmental
suppression of Africans in favor of Arabs.78 The Sudanese government had
increasingly become more Arab in membership, and Sudanese society had
become more culturally Arab as well.79 This marginalization led to a
revival of civil conflict.8 0 The SLA struck law enforcement locations and
69. Sudan, supra note 59.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. Id.
74. Sudan, supra note 59.

75. Id.
76. Darfur means homeland ofthe Fur tribe. Human Rights Watch, Targetingthe Fur: Mass
Killings in Darfur A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, 4 (Jan. 21, 2005), available at
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/darfur0105/darfur0105.pdf.
77. The SLA is a different group than the SPLA. See Scott Anderson, How Did Darfur
Happen?,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004, availableat 2004 WLNR 5575284.
78. The American Society of International Law, ASIL Insights: The UN. Responds to the
Crisis in Darfur: Security Council Resolution 1556 (Aug. 2004)[hereinafter ASIL Insights],
availableat http://www.asil.org/insightsinsigh 142.htm.
79. See Anderson, supra note 77.

80. Id.
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official buildings in August 2003 to loot military supplies. 8' The
government countered with aerial bombardments in coordination with land
assaults conducted by militia, known as the Janjaweed 2 in Darfur."
Although a cease-fire agreement was made in September of 2003, fighting
continued in December 2003.4 In January 2004, the government and
Janjaweed "conducted a massive government offensive" against Darfur.85

The government denied unrestricted access to humanitarian agencies.8 6
The SLA responded by attacking government troops in February and
March 2004.87 The government countered with a "scorched earth
campaign" against "civilians and civilian villages." '8 A peace agreement
was reached in January 9, 2005.89
The Janjaweed belong mostly to Arab tribes. 9° These tribes are
nomadic and landless.9" The attacks have mainly targeted three African
tribes: the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa.92
2. Method of Attack
The reported attacks follow a similar pattern. Civilians are the major
targets in Darfur.93 Attacks are made without prior warning.94 Early in the
morning or in the evening, a village is attacked
by air, then the Janjaweed
95
or government forces or both attack by land.

81. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 6.
82. Janjaweed means "highway robbers and outlaws." Id. at 7, and "devils on horseback"
Anderson, supra note 77. Janjaweed is "an epithet long used in the region to describe any bandit
or highwayman regardless of race." Id.
83. ASIL Insights, supra note 78; Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 6-7.
84. ASIL Insights, supra note 78.
85. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 10.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id.
89. Sudan, supra note 59.
90. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 2, 7 (alleging that the Sudanese government
denied non-Arab individuals to become part of the Janjaweed, did not issue non-Arabs weapons,
and covertly met with Arab tribal leaders for recruitment purposes); ESCOR Report 33.
91. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 2.
92. Id. at 3; ESCOR Report 33.
93. ESCOR Report 57.
94. Id. 58.
95. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 8; ESCOR Report 29.
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Aerial bombardments target "crowded areas such as markets or

communal wells; homes, shops and fields" and even fleeing people." Both
forces are dressed in battle gear and weaponry. 97

Ground forces destroyed property and steal livestock.9" Forces
destroyed dwelling places, agriculture, water sources, stores and other

civilian targets. 99 Pillaging and looting were common, especially of
livestock.'00

Women are subject to rape and sexual assault,'

accompanied by

further humiliating treatment such as "severe whipping" or taking the
victim's clothing."0 2 Rape is often committed by more than one male. 3
Rape victims are beaten, restrained, raped in front of relatives, and some
have become pregnant.'43 Attackers used "pejorative and racist language"
in regards to civilian victims.0 5
The villagers are forced to flee."° Victims flee to other cities in Sudan,
as internally displaced persons or flee to Chad as refugees.0 7 The United
Nations has reported that 1.65 million people are internally displaced and
that greater than 200,000 are refugees.'0° Reports differ on exactly how
many people have died, been internally displaced, or have sought refuge
in other states. There are U.N. reports as high as 200,000 deaths and 2.4
million displaced. '9 Displaced persons are afraid to return to their villages

96. ESCOR Report

58.

97. Id. 29.
98. Id. 30.
99. Id, 70.
100. Id. 70-71.
101. Sudanese women face many challenges after being raped. An unmarried Sudanese victim
who becomes pregnant may be prosecuted for adultery if she cannot prove she was raped. In Sudan
adultery is a capital crime. Thus, victims must risk their own prosecution for the capital offense of
adultery in order to report rape. Further, Sudanese police rarely accept complaints or investigate

them. Both regular and military courts delay or suppress cases. Warren Hoge, UN. Charges Sudan
Ignores Rapes in Darfurby Militaryand Police,N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 2005, at A8.
102. ESCOR Report 32; Nicholas D. Kristof, The Dead Walk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004,
at A17 ("[Azhra Abdel Karim] had been gang-raped along with her two sisters, who were then
killed. Ms. Zahra was slashed with a sword and left to hobble away, naked and bleeding ...
103. ESCOR Report 66.
104. Id.
105. Id. 33.
106. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 8.
107. ESCOR Report 74; see Sapienza, supra note 2, at 890.
108. Report of the Int ! Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Sec'y-Gen.,
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 226 (Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Inquiry on
Dar ur].
109. Felicia R. Lee, Children ofDarfurKnow About Life Amid Carnage,N.Y. TIMEs, July 6,
2005, at E3. Others report 10,000 are killed each month. Sudan: Justice in Darfur, Why America
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because they are vulnerable to more violent attacks by the Janjaweed." °
Some of them live under trees and survive off of wild seeds."' Particularly
young girls and women are often the victims of rape and sexual violence
when they venture outside of towns to gather wood." 2 The internally
displaced are essentially trapped away from their villages, but within
Sudan's borders." 3
Many displaced persons are later unable to locate family members." 4
Civilians may also have been abducted." 5
The Janjaweed have allegedly beaten, raped, looted, and killed their
victims. "6 After being asked what bad things the Janjaweed had done, one
Janjaweed member explained, "Everything you can think of. Maybe some
other things too.""' 7 Reports of torture and maltreatment in Darfur have
been made, including the use of hot irons pressed on human limbs,
fastening humans to camels to be dragged at high speeds, trampling
humans to death, shootings, stabbings, throwing children into fires, rape,
and forcing humans to do animal labor.' The Janjaweed have destroyed
villages and even polluted water supplies." 9 The violence is committed
without any repercussions to the attackers. 20
The rebel forces have also taken part in the conflict. Rebel forces have
been accused of robbery and polluting water sources.'12 They have used
civilian locations as a base for their attacks. 22 They have allegedly
abducted and recruited underaged youth to serve as soldiers.' 23 They also
Should Give a Chance to the International Criminal Court, ECONOMIST, Feb. 5,2005, at 54. Others

report about 400,000 dead overall. Marc Lacey, Letterfrom Africa; The Mournful Math ofDarfur:
The Dead Don't Add Up, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at A4; Sudan: Death and Division,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2005, at 56. All projections are mere estimates, because there are no death
certificates or accurate census numbers available. Lacey, supra, at A4. There is no doubt that the
numbers will have increased by the time this Article is published.
110. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 18; ESCOR Report M60, 61.
111. Nicholas D. Kristof, As Humans Are Hunted, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at A27.
112. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 19; ESCOR Report 67; Somini Sengupta,
Unrelenting Attacks on Women in West Sudan Provoke anInternational Outcry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 2004, at A10.
113. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 20.
114. ESCOR Report 82.
115. Id. 83.
116. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 17.
117. Anderson, supra note 77.
118. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 16.
119. ASIL Insights, supra note 78.
120. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 20; ESCOR Report 36.
121. ESCOR Report 50.
122. See id. 51.
123. Id. 52.
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have abducted local leaders to prevent them from working with the
government.m24
The total death toll may still be unknown as the tragedy in Darfur has

not yet ended. As of October 2004, the World Health Organization
approximated that 70,000 people have perished from hunger and illness
alone. 25 As of November 2005, it was estimated that over 200,000 had
died. 2 1 It is also estimated that 5,000 to 10,000 lives may be lost per
month or 200 lives per day. 127 The total numbers will continue to change
daily and cannot be calculated until the conflict is over.

IV. THE LEGAL QUESTION OF GENOCIDE IN DARFUR
A. Introduction
Overall, the United States and the United Nations disagree on whether
genocide is occurring in Darfur. The United States has concluded that
genocide is occurring in Sudan and that the specific intent for genocide is
satisfied. 28 The United Nations, however, concluded that there was
insufficient evidence29 of genocidal intent and therefore genocide is not
occurring in Sudan.
B. Differing Conclusions: The US. and U.N. Perspectives
1. U.S. Perspective: Genocide is Occurring in Darfur
The United States supports the position that genocide is occurring in
Sudan. In July 2004, the House of Representatives passed a concurrent
resolution declaring that the "atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan are

124. Id. j53.
125. Kristof, supra note 102.
126. Reuters, Rebel Disputes Delay Darfur Peace Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2005, at A9.
127. Id.
128. Secretary Colin L. Powell, The Crisis in Darfur: Testimony Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Comm. (Sept. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Powell, Testimony], available at http://www.state.
gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm; Secretary Colin L. Powell, The Crisis in Darfur:
Written Remarks Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. (Sept. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Powell,
Written Remarks], availableathttp://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36032.htm.
129. Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 108,
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genocide."' 3 ° The resolution also called upon the Bush administration to
publicly identify the acts in Sudan as genocide. 3 '
More noticeably, former Secretary of State Colin Powell concluded that
"genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of
Sudan and the Jingaweit [or Janjaweed] bear responsibility"'32 for the
genocide, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in September 2004. Powell reiterated the possibility that "genocide may
still be occurring."' 33 Powell admitted that genocide was a U.S. finding and
not the finding of the world."
Powell stated that the elements in the Genocide Convention had been
met.' More specifically, Powell claimed that there was evidence of the
specific intent needed for a finding of genocide, and that the specific intent
could be deduced from intentional actions. 36
Powell personally visited Sudan before making his statement.'37 He
based his conclusion on investigational interviews of Sudanese refugees
in Chad.'38 The Department of State compiled the evidence derived from
this investigation in a report published on its website.' 39
The report gathered the findings from the Atrocities Documentation
Team's interviews with 1136 randomly chosen refugees in Chad in July
and August 2004. 140 The investigations revealed an ethnic conflict between
Arabs, consisting of the Sudanese government along with Janjaweed, and
41
Non-Arabs, particularly three tribes, the Zaghawa, Massalit, and Fur.'
The Janjaweed and the government acted in concert with each other in
attacks on villages. 42 The attacks followed a recurrent design. 43
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

H.R. Con. Res. 467, 108th Cong. § 1 (2004).
Id. § 3.
Powell, Testimony, supra note 128.
Id.
Id.
Powell, Written Remarks, supra note 128.
Id.
Powell, Testimony, supra note 128.
Id.

139. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,

DOCUMENTING

ATRocrrEs IN DARFUR (Sept. 2004), available at

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.

Most reports followed a similar pattern:
I)GOS aircraft or helicopters bomb villages.
2)GOS soldiers arrive in trucks, followed closely by Jingaweit militia riding
horses or camels.
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Victims of attacks were principally non-Arabs in Darfur.'" Those
interviewed believe they were targeted because they are non-Arabs.' 4 5
Around one-third of interviewees heard Government and Janjaweed
attackers use racial and ethnic remarks. '"
Attackers abducted and killed males of military age, even though nine
out of ten interviewees claimed there were no rebel activities in their

villages.

47

Sixty-one percent of those interviewed witnessed the killing of

a family member. 4" Attackers abducted and raped women and even young
girls. 49 Overall, victims reported murder, abduction, physical beatings,
racial insults, looting, loss of livestock, rape, and destruction of villages. 50
Although Powell called upon the United Nations to make a complete
investigation, Powell concluded that a finding of genocide necessitated "no
new action" by the United States. 5 1 Powell even
indicated that the label
52

of "genocide" may not have any significance. 1

3)GOS soldiers and militia surround and then enter villages, under cover of
gunfire.
4)Fleeing villagers are targets in aerial bombing.
5)The Jingaweit and GOS soldiers loot the village after most citizens have fled,
often using trucks to remove belongings.
6)Villages often experience multiple attacks over a prolonged period before they
are destroyed by burning or bombing.
144. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 139.
145. Id.
146. "'Kill the slaves; Kill the slaves!' and 'We have orders to kill all the blacks'... 'We kill
all blacks and even kill our cattle when they have black calves."' Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.

149. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 139.
150. Id.
151. Powell, Testimony, supra note 128.
152. Id. ("Call it civil war; call it ethnic cleansing; call it genocide; call it 'none of the above.'
The reality is the same. There are people in Darfur who desperately need the help of the
international community."); Powell, Written Remarks, supra note 128.
Mr. Chairman, some seem to have been waiting for this determination of genocide
to take action. In fact, however, no new action is dictated by this determination.
We have been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese Government to act
responsibly. So let us not be too preoccupied with this designation. These people
are in desperate need and we must help them. Call it civil war; call it ethnic
cleansing; call it genocide; call it "none of the above." The reality is the same.
There are people in Darfur who desperately need the help of the international
community.
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The finding of genocide in Sudan has not only been made by
government officials, but also by the American people. An eclectic number
of groups in the United States support a finding of genocide in Sudan.'53
One author listed the groups in favor of the genocide label to include:
Jewish-Americans, African-Americans, liberals, religious-conservatives,
the Holocaust Museum, MoveOn.org, the Congressional Black Caucus,
African-American civil rights groups, newspaper editorialists, and

American evangelicals." The general American consensus from the local
paper to the White House seems to be that genocide is occurring in Darfur.
2. U.N. Perspective: Genocide is not Occurring in Darfur Because
Genocidal Intent is Lacking
The U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 1564 in September
2004.' The resolution, made pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
authorized the formation of a commission (Commission) in order "to
investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and
human rights law in Darfur by all parties; to determine whether or not acts
of genocide have occurred; to identify the perpetrators of violations of
international humanitarian law and human rights in Darfur; and to suggest
means of ensuring that those responsible are held accountable .... 56
Previously, the Security Council had condemned the human rights and
humanitarian law violations in Sudan and decided that the atrocities in
Sudan could be characterized as "a threat to international peace and
security," but had not made a formal declaration that what was occurring
constituted genocide.5 7 The Secretary General appointed a team of experts
to the Commission.55 The Commission traveled throughout the three
states in Darfur and met with government officials, military members,
rebel leaders, "tribal leaders, internally displaced persons, victims and
witnesses of violations, NGOs and U.N. representatives."' 59The Report of
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the U.N. Secretary
General (U.N. Report) was submitted on January 25, 2005.' 6

153. Scott Straus, Darfurand the Genocide Debate, Jan./Feb. FOREIGN AFF. 128 (2005).
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Inquiry on Darfur,supra note 108, at 2.
Id.
See S.C. Res. 1556, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 556 (July 30, 2004).
Inquiry on Darfur,supra note 108, at 2.
Id.
Id.
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Overall, although the Commission made findings that many crimes
against humanity and war crimes had been committed in Darfur,' 6' the
Commission ultimately found that the Sudanese government did not
commit genocide because the element of genocidal or specific intent was
not met. 62 However, the Commission did leave open the possibility that
individuals may have acted with the necessary intent for genocide.' 63
The Commission noted that only certain groups are protected from
genocide under international law: national, ethnic, racial, or religious
groups. ' Thus, the predicate issue to whether genocide occurred in Darfur
is whether the victimized tribal groups constitute a protected group. The
Commission concluded that tribal groups could constitute a protected
group "only if... they also exhibit the characteristics of one of the four
categories of group protected by international law."'' 6 Whether a group is
protected may be determined by an objective test of whether the targeted
group is a stable and permanent group, constituted in a permanent fashion
and membership of which is determined by birth.'" The issue of whether
a targeted group is a protected group may also be determined by a
subjective test, 67 which may consider "whether [1] a set of persons are
perceived and in fact treated as belonging to one of the protected groups,
[2] they consider themselves as belonging to one of such
and in addition
168

groups.'
The Commission could not find objective evidence that the Fur,
Massalit, and Zaghawa tribes were "ethnic groups distinct from the ethnic
group to which persons or militias that attack them belong" because they
speak the same language, have the same religion, cannot be differentiated
by physical traits, and intermarry. 69 However, the Commission did find
that the tribes met the subjective standard as a protected group 7 ' because
"the victims perceive the attackers as persons belonging to another and
hostile group."''

161. Id. at 4.
162. Id. 518.
163. Inquiry on Darfur,supra note 108,

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

168.
169.
170.
171.

Inquiry on Darfur,supra note 108,
Id. 508.
Id. 512.
Id. 511.

520.

490.
497.
498 (internal quote marks omitted).
499.
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The Commission recognized that in most cases the specific intent must
be inferred from the conduct and circumstances of the attack.172 The factfinder may infer intent from "the general context, the perpetration of other
culpable acts systematically directed against the same group, the scale of
atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of
their membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destruction and
discriminatory acts."' 73 Although the Commission admitted there were
facts that could be construed to evidence specific intent for genocide, 74 the
Commission ultimately concluded that genocidal intent was absent
because victimizers killed certain groups of young males instead of
exterminating entire village populations,' 7 because survivors were not
killed but were forced into camps,

76 because

villages consisting of African

and Arab tribes were not attacked, 77 and because in some cases persons
7
who did not resist were spared while persons who did resist were killed.' 1
To the Commission, this evidence indicated that the attackers had the
intent to kill rebels instead79 of the specific intent to destroy a protected
group in whole or in part.1
Although the U.N. Report concluded that genocide had not been
conducted by the government of Sudan, the Commission did not exculpate
the Sudanese government, the Janjaweed, or the rebels. The Commission
declared two undisputed facts. 8 ° First, that 1.65 million people are
internally displaced within Sudan and that more than 200,000 people are
refugees in Chad.' Second, the Commission declared that villages
throughout Darfur have been destroyed."8 2
The U.N. Report also detailed the international crimes, other than
genocide, committed in Darfur by the government of Sudan, Janjaweed,
and the rebels." 3 The violations included: indiscriminate attacks on

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. 502.
Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 108,
Id. 513.
Id.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. 515.
Id. 516.
Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 108,

502.

517.

Id. 514.
Id. 226.
Id. 226.
Id. IM226, 233.
Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 108, 1237.
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civilians,' 4 killing of civilians,8 5 killing of detained enemy servicemen,
killing of wounded enemy servicemen,' 87 wanton destruction of villages
or devastation not justified by military necessity,1 8 forcible transfer of
civilian populations, 89 rape and other forms of sexual violence,"9 torture,
outrages upon personal dignity and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment,19' plunder, 92 unlawful confinement, incommunicado detentions
and enforced disappearances,' 93 and recruitment and use of children under
the age of 15 in armed hostilities.'" The Commission concluded that many
of these violations committed in Darfur constitute or are likely to
constitute war crimes' and crimes against humanity, 96 particularly
persecution. '"
C. Analysis
1. The Actus Reus Element of Genocide in Darfur is Undisputed.
The actus reus element of genocide is easily established in Darfur.'"g
First, the United States and the United Nations both report the killing of
civilians.' 99 This would satisfy the Genocide Convention Article 2(a)
proscribing "[k]illing members of the group."2 ' ° Second, the torture,
beatings, and sexual violence would satisfy Article 2(b) prohibiting

184. Id.I238-68.
185. Id. '"[269-96.
186. Id. N 297-98.
187. Id. IM 299-300.
188. Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 108, IN 301-21.
189. Id. -M322-32.
190. Id. IN 333-61.
191. Id. N 362-79.
192. Id. 380-94.
193. Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 108, M395-413.
194. Id. M414-18.
195. Id. " 267-68, 298, 319, 391,412-13.
196. Id. IN 293, 360, 379, 411.
197. Id.% 295, 321, 332, 360, 379, 393.
198. Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 108, 507.
199. Id.; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 139 ("Analysis of the refugee interviews points to
a pattern of abuse against members of Darfur's non-Arab communities, including murder ....
Sixty-one percent reported witnessing the killing of a family member.").
200. Genocide Convention, supra note 28, art. 2(a).
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"[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group."2 °1
Serious bodily harm does not have to be injury that is "permanent or
irremediable." ' 2 Serious mental harm does not have to stem from bodily
injury." 3 Third, Article 2(c) prohibiting "[d]eliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part" may be satisfied by "systematically destroying [tribal]
villages and crops, by expelling [tribal members] from their homes,.., by
looting their cattle,"'2"4 by the forced displacement of massive amounts of
people in Darfur,2" by the lack of unrestricted humanitarian access to
displaced persons, 206 and by the hostile conditions in which displaced
persons live.207 Although the displaced persons may not die immediately
from their displacement, "methods of destruction which do not
immediately lead to... ." death are not necessary for such a finding. 08
2. Mens Rea: The Center of Contention
The most important issue of contention between the U.S perspective
and the U.N. perspective is whether the situation in Darfur has met the
mens rea element of genocide. This issue can be broken down into two
further issues: (1) whether the tribes targeted constitute an ethnic group in
an ethnic conflict such that the tribes are within the scope of the
international law of genocide, (2) if so, whether there was sufficient
evidence of genocidal intent by the government of Sudan and the
Janjaweed.

201. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, 108 (May
21, 1999) ("The Akayesu Judgement further held that acts of sexual violence, rape, mutilations and
interrogations combined with beatings, and/or threats of death, were all acts that amount to serious
bodily harm.").
202. Id. at 108.
203. Id. at 110.
204. Inquiry on Darfur,supra note 108, 507; see Jamil Jafari, "Never Again," Again:
Darfur,The GenocideConvention, andthe Duty to Prevent Genocide, 12 No. IHUM. RTs. BRIEF
8, 9(2004).

205. Warren Hoge, World Briefing UnitedNations: InternationalPanelTo Weigh Genocide
Claims,N.Y. TaIms, Oct. 9,2004, at A7 ("1.4 million have been forced offtheir land in a campaign
that the United Nations has labeled ethnic cleansing and the United States has called genocide.").
206. ESCOR Report 75 ("[Slerious problems remain in the way ofensuring full, unrestricted
humanitarian access to all parts of Darfur."); id. 77 (observing that even when aid is offered, IDPs
refuse aid for fear of retaliatory violence); Kristof, supra note 111 (reporting that "more than
500,000 victims of the Darfur genocide... are beyond the reach of international aid.").
207. ESCOR Report 76 (noting that internally displaced persons risk violence, looting,
abduction, and rape within the camps).
208. Kayishema & Ruzindana,Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, at 116.
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a. The Tribal Victims are a Protected Group Covered by the
International Law of Genocide
An ethnic group is "a group whose members share a common language
or culture." 2 9 Because the African tribes targeted (the Fur, Massalit, and
Zaghawa tribes) speak Arabic and practice Islam, they appear to be
ethnically the same as the Arabs who make up the government and the
Janjaweed." ° The U.N. Report, however, was correct in finding that they
still constitute an ethnic group because they perceive themselves to be
different than their attackers.2 ' In international law, perception is
recognized
as a means of establishing one's group as a distinct ethnic
212
group.
The subjective approach to identifying a protected group can be done
in two ways: positive stigmatization or negative stigmatization." 3 For
positive stigmatization, the genocidist targets the group because of the
genocidist's view of the group's traits.2 4 For example, the genocidist may
target those with black skin.21 ' For negative stigmatization, the genocidist
targets the group because of the genocidist's view of what traits the group
does not have. 1 For example, the genocidist may target those without
black skin. Thus, it is feasible for the African tribes targeted in Sudan to
be classified as a protected group, as long as the Arab perpetrators targeted
the African tribes because the Arab perpetrators perceived the African
victims to be a different ethnic group, based on characteristics different
from those of Arabs. This is analogous to the ICTR Akayesu judgment,
which held that Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda were distinct ethnic groups
based on their own perceptions, 21 7 "even though [the Tutsi] shared
language, society, and culture with the Hutu that massacred them."2 8"
One explanation given for the tensions between Africans and Arabs is
that the African tribes are mainly sedentary and agricultural based,
whereas the Arab tribes are mainly nomadic. 2 9 Thus, it is possible to argue

209. Nersessian, supra note 27, at 300 (internal quote marks omitted).
210. Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 108,1508.

211. Seeid. "511-512.
212. See id. 498.

213. Nersessian supra note 27, at 309.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, M511, 702 (Sept. 2,
1998); Nersessian, supra note 27, at 304; Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 108, 498.
218. Nersessian, supra note 27, at 304.
219. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76, at 5.
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that the conflict between the Arabs and Africans is not an ethnic conflict
but a resource conflict. The two groups have been involved in hostilities
over available land.220 The ability to "gain loot and access... fertile land
and water resources" served as an incentive to join the Janjaweed.22' In
international law, however, motive is distinguishable from intent.222 Even
though the perpetrators may have been motivated by economic gain, that
motive does not necessarily negate the simultaneous existence of
genocidal intent.223 A genocidist may possess both financial motive and the
requisite intent for genocide.24

Ultimately, both the United States and the United Nations are correct
in pronouncing that the tribes victimized in Darfur are a distinct ethnic
group from their attackers and the conflict is based on ethnicity. Therefore,
the international law of genocide protects the victims in Darfur.
b. Sufficient Evidence of Genocidal Intent Exists
The United States has claimed that genocide is occurring in Darfur and
that there is sufficient evidence of genocidal intent.225 However, the United
States failed to articulate any legal analysis for the existence of such
genocidal intent.226 On the other hand, the United Nations did a thorough
legal analysis of the issue, but concluded that genocidal intent was lacking
in Darfur. 7 It is this author's opinion that the United States made the
correct finding that genocidal intent exists. This section will attempt to
counter the legal analysis made by the United Nations to the contrary and
will provide the legal analysis justifying the conclusion that there is
sufficient evidence of genocidal intent on the part of the Sudanese
government and the Janjaweed.

220. Id.
221. Id. at 7; see ESCOR Report 33.
222. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT 95-10, Judgment (ICTY Appeals Chamber), 49 (July
5,2001) (Appeals Chamber); Inquiry on Darfur,supra note 108, 493; Nersessian, supra note 27,
at 315; Nersessian, supra note 26, at 267-68. The case law of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia is available on its web site, http://www.un.org/icty/.
223. Nersessian, supra note 27, at 315; Cecile Tournaye, ShorterArticle, Comment, andNote,
Genocidal Intent Before the ICTY, INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 52.2(447) (2003); Nersessian, supra note

26, at 268.
224. See Nersessian, supra note 27, at 315; Nersessian, supra note 26, at 268.
225. See generally Powell, Written Remarks, supra note 128.
226. See id.
227. Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 108,
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3. Unraveling the Argument Against Genocidal Intent: The Rationale
Justifying the U.N.'s Conclusion is Flawed
a. The Krstic Case Supports a Finding of Genocidal Intent even when
Only Military Aged Men are Executed
First, the United Nations reasoned that genocidal intent was lacking
because perpetrators killed mostly men instead of destroying the entire
population.228 For genocidal intent to exist, the perpetrator must intend to
destroy the group in whole or in part.29 Under international law, "in whole
or in part" simply means a "'substantial' part., 230 There are a few views of
what a substantial part means. On one end, there is a view, which
interprets substantial part to mean the annihilation of "a quantitatively
substantial part of the protected group., 23 1 On the other end of the
spectrum, there is a view, which interprets substantial part to include the
annihilation of "a fraction of a protected group. 232 As a compromise
between these extremes, there is a view that a substantial portion may
mean either a "large portion" or a "significant section of a group, such as
its leaders. 233
In the Krstic case, the VSR executed 8,000 to 10,000 military aged
Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica in July 1995.234 Also, when the town
was captured it resulted in 20,000 to 25,000 refugees.2 35 This is analogous
to the situation in Darfur where men were specifically targeted as
victims 2 36 and the conflict resulted in a multitude ofrefugees and displaced
persons. 237 The ICTY trial chamber in the Krstic case addressed whether
"the Bosnian Muslim men of military age ... represented a sufficient part
of the Bosnian Muslim group so that the intent to destroy them qualifies
as an 'intent to destroy the group in whole or in part .... ,23' The ICTY
trial chamber ultimately held that intending to kill the military aged men

228.
229.
230.
2, 2001).
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. 513.
Jelisic, Case No. IT 95-10,9167.
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT 98-33, Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber),

582 (Aug.

Id. 1586.
Id. 1585.
Id. 91587 (internal quote marks omitted).
Id.1546-47.
Krstic, Case No. IT 98-33, 1568.
See ESCOR Report 160.
Id. 1 74; see Sapienza, supra note 2, at 890.
Krstic, Case No. IT 98-33, 1581.
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was sufficient intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in part and thus met
the requirements for genocide.239
The ICTY trial chamber reasoned that genocidal intent could be
inferred from the evidence that the executions happened at the same time
as the displacement of the remaining Bosnian Muslim group, that "this
selective destruction of the group would have a lasting impact upon the
entire group," that the victimizers knew that the destruction of the men
plus the displacement of "women, children, and elderly would inevitably
result in the physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population at
Srebrenica," and that the perpetrators also destroyed the Bosnian Muslims'
dwellings and religious sites.2'
The atrocity in Srebrenica is analogous to the atrocities in Darfur. In
Darfur men of military age were killed at a time when many were forced
to flee as refugees or displaced persons.24 ' There is also evidence that tribal
leaders were specifically targeted in Darfur. For example, in March 2004,
the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed executed 200 displaced Fur
men including several leaders such as the sheikhs and omdas.242 The men
were collected in groups, imprisoned in police stations, and then taken
away and shot.243 The destruction of the men would inevitably mean the
destruction of the entire African tribes in the Darfur region. It is self
evident that in order to prevent procreation of a group, the genocidist need
only kill one gender. This not only denies the right of the group to exist,
which is the policy behind the law of genocide, 2' but it also saves the
genocidist time and resources in executing her genocidal plan.
Since genocide is an inchoate crime,24 the Sudanese government did
not need to kill all members of the African tribes in order to have

genocidal intent. The success of the Sudanese government in destroying
the African tribes is simply irrelevant for a finding of genocide.2 ' Unlike
"result-oriented" crimes, inchoate crimes punish "acts committed with a

particular mental state, whether or not those acts actually lead to the injury
' It would be ludicrous to allow those guilty of genocide
contemplated."247
to avoid prosecution merely because they did not fully accomplish their
239. Id. 598.
240. Id. 595.
241. See ESCOR Report 74; see Sapienza, supranote 2, at 890; Human Rights Watch, supra
note 76, at 1-4.
242. Human Rights Watch, supranote 76, at 11-12.
243. Id.at 12.
244. Alonzo-Maizlish, supranote 30, at 1375.
245. Nersessian, supra note 27, at 298; Nersessian, supra note 26, at 256.
246. See Nersessian, supra note 26, at 256.
247. Nersessian, supra note 27, at 298-99; Nersessian, supra note 26, at 256-57.
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goal of annihilating the protected group or because they did attempt to
accomplish their goal in a more efficient manner.
This conclusion does not contradict the U.N. finding that killing men
was for the purpose of killing rebels and preventing the rebels from
obtaining support and cover from villages. 8 It is possible that the
Sudanese government and the Janjaweed could have possessed both the
purpose of genocide and the purpose of quashing the rebels at the same
time. It was incorrect for the United Nations to conclude that the
annihilation of military aged men negated the intent necessary for
genocide.
b. Delayed Death or Inefficient Annihilation does not Negate a
Finding of Genocidal Intent
Second, the United Nations reasoned that genocidal intent was absent
because victims were not always killed but were instead placed in
camps.2 49 The United Nations relied on the fact that the Sudanese
government has allowed humanitarian aid to the internally displaced
population.2 50 However, there is evidence that humanitarian organizations
were denied unrestricted access to the internally displaced persons,251 and
that victims were terrorized from accepting aid from humanitarian
organizations for fear of reprisal from the Janjaweed.252 With these facts
in mind, it is possible to interpret the placement of surviving villagers in
camps as a means of accomplishing the annihilation of the Africans in a
manner that simply took more time and attracted less international
attention than annihilation by means of outright execution of the entire
African population would have. The ICTY Trial Chamber in the Krstic
case considered the removal of the females, youth, and aged population of
the Bosnian Muslims in tandem with the execution of the military aged
men, when it concluded that genocidal intent existed. 253 The Appellate
Chamber acknowledged that it was possible that the transfer may have
"undermine[d] the finding of genocidal intent" but ultimately reasoned that

248. Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 108, 514.
249. Id. 515.
250. Id.
251. ESCOR Report 75 ("[S]erious problems remain in the way ofensuring full, unrestricted
humanitarian access to all parts ofDarfur."); id. 77 (observing that even when aid is offered, IDPs
refuse aid for fear of retaliatory violence); Kristof, supra note 111 (reporting that "more than
500,000 victims of the Darfur genocide... are beyond the reach of international aid.").
252. ESCOR Report 77.
253. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT 98-33, Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber), 595 (Aug.
2, 2001).
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it was "also susceptible... [to] an alternative interpretation" in that it was
"an additional means by which to ensure the physical destruction of the
' Genocide does not require
Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica."254
the genocidist to actually accomplish the annihilation of the entire
group. 255 Even the Nazis kept some of their victims alive in labor and
concentration camps instead of immediately killing them. Yet one could
not argue that because there were Jews remaining alive in concentration
camps when the U.S. forces liberated them, that the Nazis had lacked
genocidal intent. Such argument would be intellectually bankrupt.
Likewise, it was intellectually bankrupt for the United Nations to conclude
that because the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed allowed, and in
many cases trapped some victims to continue to live under horrendous
conditions in Internally Displaced Persons camps that genocidal intent was
not present.
c. Allowing the Mixture of Ethnic Victims to Negate Genocidal Intent
Would Give Genocidists a Loophole from Liability
Third, the United Nations reasoned that genocidal intent was missing
because many villages of both African and Arab inhabitants were not
attacked or destroyed and that persons who did not resist attack were
spared.256 The United Nations concluded that this proved that the
257
government and the Janjaweed did not wish to annihilate the group.
Although this is a more credible justification for the lack of genocidal

intent than the others given by the United Nations, it is also possible that
this is merely evidence that the perpetrators were executing their plan of
genocide in a haphazard fashion. A detailed methodical plan is not
required under international law for a finding of genocide, although it may
be considered as evidence of intent.258 If it is true that the mixing of
victims negates the possibility of genocide, then consider the logical
extremes this may reach. For example, in Country E there are two ethnic
groups: the Amy tribe and the Jamie tribe. The government of Country E,
which consists mostly of Amy tribal members, starts a campaign of killing

resulting in the death of 98% of the ten million Jamie population, but also
kills ten members of the ten million Amy population. If the mixture of
254.
(Apr. 19,
255.
256.
257.
258.
1999).

Prosecutor v.Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment (ICTY Appeals Chamber), IM30-31
2004).
Id. 32; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 1497 (Sept. 2, 1998).
Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 108, M516-17.
Id. 517.
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1 -T,Judgment, 94 (May 21,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

27

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 3

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA

[
(VOL
18

ethnic victims negates the possibility of finding genocidal intent, then this
would leave an enormous loophole for genocidists. There is evidence that
most of the victims in Darfur, although not all, are African.259 Perhaps it
is possible that genocidal intent could exist, even though members of Arab
tribes were also killed and members of African tribes did survive.
The U.N. construction of evidence leading to the finding that genocidal
intent is lacking is not persuasive. However, simply because the reasoning
against the presence of genocidal intent is subject to criticism does not
prove that there indeed was genocidal intent by the government and the
Janjaweed.
4. The Argument in Favor of Genocidal Intent
Genocidal intent is the specific intent to "destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." ' 4 The issue of
whether any of the prohibited enumerated acts were committed is
discussed in Part IV.C. 1. The issue of whether the tribes targeted can be
classified as a protected group is discussed in Part 1V.C.2.a. But the issue
of whether there is sufficient evidence of genocidal intent remains to be
established.
Genocidal intent is the specific "intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a group, as such."26' The genocidist must target his victim because of her
membership in the protected group,262 because the object of genocide is to
"destroy the group."263 Thus, the victim is both the individual and the
individual's group.2' 4 Also, the genocidist must have intended to annihilate
the protected group "in whole or in part."265
Genocidal intent can be inferred on an individual basis. 2' Genocidal
intent can be inferred from a variety of factors including:

259. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 139; Powell, Testimony, supra note 128.
260. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 498 (Sept. 2, 1998).
261. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, 311 (May
15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, 164 (Jan.
27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3, Judgment and Sentence, 9159 (Dec. 6,
1999); Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 520.
262. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95- I-T, 97; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case
No. ICTR 95-1A-T, Judgment, 1 61 (June 7, 2001); Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, 1 312;
Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, 1 165; Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 1521.
263. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-IA-T, 161.
264. Id. 61; Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, 1 165; Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3, 1
60; Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 1521.
265. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, 1312.
266. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, 1 167.
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[1] the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts
systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts
were committed by the same offender or by others... [2] the scale
of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a
country, or furthermore, [3] the fact of deliberately and
systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of
a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups...
[4] the general political doctrine which gave rise to the acts... [5]
the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts .... or [6] the
perpetration of the acts which violate, or which the perpetrators
themselves consider to violate the very foundation of the
group--acts which are not in themselves covered by the list.., but
which are committed as part of the same pattern of conduct. 7
Other factors that may be considered are:
[7] the physical targeting of the group or their property; [8] the use
of derogatory language toward members of the targeted group; [9]
the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury; [10] the
methodical way ofplanning, the systemic manner of killing.... the
[ 1] number of victims from the group... [and 12] the relative
proportionate scale of the actual or attempted destruction of a group
268

In applying the factors of intent to Darfur, it is easy to justify a finding
that the government and the Janjaweed possessed genocidal intent. First,
victims have reported that discriminatory language was used when they
were attacked.269 This serves as evidence of factor eight,27° the use of
derogatory language, and of factor three, the intentional targeting of
victims because of their membership in the protected group.27'

267. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 523 (internal quote marks omitted); see also Inquiry
on Darfur,supranote 108, 128, n.185; Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, 62; Semanza,
Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, 313; Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, 166; Rutaganda, Case No.
ICTR 96-3, 61.
268. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95- 1-T, Judgment, 93 (May 21,
1999) (internal quote marks omitted).
269. Inquiry on Darfur,supranote 108, 513; U.S. DEP'TOFSTATE, supranote 139; ESCOR
Report 33.
270. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, 93.

271. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 33.
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Second, the weapons reportedly used against the victims include
"bombs,"272 "helicopter gunships, 273 "AK-47s, G3s and rockets. 274
Surely, these abnormally dangerous
275 combat weapons are the type of
weapons factor nine is referring to.
Third, the general pattern followed by the government and the
Janjaweed included aerial bombing followed by ground forces 276 on a
scorched earth campaign of destruction and looting of villages.27 7 This
method was used over and over again against multiple villages.2 78 This
recurring destruction of villages in the same manner would be evidence of
factor five, the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts, 279 factor
seven, the physical targeting of the group and their property, 280 and factor
ten, the methodical way of a planning and the systemic manner of
killing.281
Fourth, the victims are normally from African as opposed to Arab
tribes. 8 2 This serves as evidence of factors three, targeting victims for their
membership in a protected group 2 3 and eleven, the number of victims
from the group. 2
Fifth, the massive numbers of deaths, displacement, and refugees serve
as evidence of factors two, the scale of atrocities committed,28 ' their
general nature, in a region or a country and factor twelve, the relative
proportionate scale of the actual or attempted destruction of a group.286
Sixth, the previous implementation of Islamic law and the constant
of
turnover in government by military coups establishes the existence
27
factor four's general political doctrine which gave rise to the acts.

272. ESCOR Report 58.
273. Id.; Anderson, supra note 77.
274. ESCOR Report 29.
275. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, 93.
276. The Current Situation in Sudan and the Prospects for Peace: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. On Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2004), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/
Powell/Remarks/36032.htm.
277. See ESCOR Report M58-63; Powell, Written Remarks, supra note 128; U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, supra note 142.
278. See ESCOR Report 58-63; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 139.
279. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 524 (Sept. 2, 1998).
280. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, 93.
281. Id.
282. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 139; Powell, Written Remarks, supra note 128.
283. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 523.
284. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, 93.
285. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 523.
286. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, 93.
287. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 524.
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Last, all together these facts indicate factor one, that the general context
was an environment of annihilation of the African tribes.2 8 It seems that
all the possible factors that an international tribunal may consider, with the
exception of perhaps factor six,2" 9 would lead to a finding of genocidal
intent.
Because the ICC is a permanent court, as opposed to an ad hoc tribunal,
the ultimate findings of the ICC on Darfur have the potential to serve as
precedent in the development of the international law of genocide and as
a deterrent to potential genocidists. This analysis reveals that the lack of
genocidal intent is not conclusively proven and may provide the ICC with
the opportunity to make findings contrary to the U.N. conclusion that
genocide is not occurring in Darfur.
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, although the issue of whether genocide is occurring in
Darfur has been a subject of dispute between the United States and the
United Nations, the issue has been referred to the ICC, as the final arbiter.
The United Nations is incorrect in concluding that genocidal intent is
lacking in Darfur. Instead, the ICC should conclude that there is sufficient
evidence of genocidal intent and hold the government of Sudan and the
Janjaweed responsible for genocide in Darfur.

288. Id. 523.
289. Id. 524.
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